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a b s t r a c t
This paper considers factors influencing change that will affect future working patterns and practices,
leisure time, employment levels and influential sectors within a 50-year time horizon (2010–2060). The
main section of this paper sketches out the drivers (demographics, technology, industry and employment)
and their implications for the future of work, employment, and leisure, whilst the next section draws
together the implications and underlines the likely impact on land use. Finally, some more radical and
non-normative, non-trend, events are introduced as a test of the robustness of the discussion.
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Introduction17
This paper begins by reflecting upon the dynamic of change in18
the recent past, and to what extent past changes set the mould for19
future development, and by considering potentially novel dynamic20
elements. It adopts a normative approach informed by social21
theorists of post-industrial society who outline the growth of non-22
manufacturing activities, and the likelihood of a shift of investment23
and political resources to education and science. This approach is24
blended with analyses of the international restructuring of eco-25
nomic activities associatedwith globalisation, in particular those of26
the spatial division of labour. Additionally, we consider the strate-27
gic importance of the international production chain of goods, and28
the competition for competitive advantage in high value added29
goods, and the processes that control their production chain. There30
is a veritable library of books and papers that discuss the subtleties31
of these approaches, and their strengths andweaknesses. However,32
they are deployed here as a means of generating broad empirical33
parameters of economic change for the future.34
The UK has experienced a long-term shift in its economic base35
from the 1930s onwards, and that accelerated in the 1970s: namely36
a shift away from manufacturing industries, a further decline of37
agricultural work, and a rise of service sector activities. Looking at38
the British space economy, we see that as international competi-39
tion grew in the20th century, UKmanufacturing began a long-term40
decline. This decline was especially marked in the regions and41
reached its most extreme in the 1970s. A subsequent wave of42
E-mail address: a.c.pratt@lse.ac.uk.
industrial and service reorganisation associated with a deepening 43
globalisation process led to the outsourcing of routinised activ- 44
ities to the regions, to metropolitan cores outside London, and 45
subsequently to far-flung global locations. Geographers have sum- 46
marised thiswider process as the spatial divisionof labour (Massey, 47
1984; Massey, 2007). This process has important consequences. 48
It compounds regional disadvantage through the concentration of 49
low skills and by limiting the basis of local economic activity. On 50
the other hand it concentrates national, and increasingly inter- 51
national, headquarters of leading industries in London, and to a 52
significant lesser extent, in other metropolitan regions. This pro- 53
cess was given a supercharged input with the ‘Big Bang’ of 1987, 54
which paved the way for London to benefit from amassive growth 55
in financial services. During the 1990s, London’s massive loss of 56
its last substantive manufacturing jobs was matched in numerical 57
terms by financial services growth (Gordon et al., 2002). Critically 58
face-to-face activities continue tobe concentrated in London (Amin 59
and Thrift, 1992). Accordingly, there has been massive demand for 60
highly priced urban land, even in a highly wired economy based 61
upon online trading. 62
These transformations are significant, and contain some impor- 63
tant subtleties that give us a clue to future changes. The shift to the 64
knowledge economy is not simply a substitution of technology for 65
labour, although this has happened. It is more accurately viewed 66
as a reconfiguration of the nature of work and production, and 67
critically involves a restructuring of where added value activities 68
take place in the production chain. New activities associated with 69
distribution, logistics, marketing, and design are increasingly the 70
source of added value, and of competitive edge (seeWalker, 1985). 71
Whilst manufacturing is not a significant part of the UK economy, 72
production in China is part of the UK value chain. 73
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It is noteworthy that the current numbers of people at work,74
and the proportion of the population that are economically75
active, is the highest ever recorded (27.3 million1). However,76
these headlines obscure the fact that this growth comprises a77
dramatic increase in part-time work, and a decline in males in78
employment and a rise in females. These changes are correlated79
with the traditional gender division of labour. Men dominate80
manufacturing activities, but these have shown significant decline.81
Moreover, the regions outside the South East have been affected82
by manufacturing decline, but without compensating growth in83
the service sector. In some cases the substantial growth that has84
occurred in services has not been sustained, as these activities are85
subject to international competition.86
Key drivers and trends87
In this section I will review the four main drivers of change88
in economic activities: demographic, technology, industrial and89
employment. Our concern is not simply with scale but also with90
the likely character and quality of change. In each case I outline the91
key characteristics of the driver and consider a range of likely and92
unlikely parameters. Beginning with demographic change makes93
it possible to gain an insight into the demand for jobs and other94
activities in the future based upon cohort analysis. The key cohort95
is the current crop of GCSE students; this group will be retiring at96
the end of the period under consideration.97
Demographic change98
The UK population is slowly growing, but at a declining rate.99
Birth rates hover around replacement rate, so the key factors are100
migration and the decline of the death and birth rates (falling 29%101
and 14% respectively in the last 50 years). Accordingly, a real issue102
will be an aging population. Between 1950 and 2000 the number103
of people over 65 grew by 70%; in 1960 11% of the population were104
over 65, and by 2040 current estimates are that 25% of the popula-105
tion will be in this category (Kinsella and He, 2009). Added to this,106
life expectancy is rising, growing by around 10% in the last 50 years.107
Thus we can see that, the recession aside, 2010 is likely to be the108
high water mark for employees in employment. The increases in109
economic activity rates of the past 50 years (see below) will prob-110
ably go into reverse during and after the present recession. This111
trend will be gradually amplified by the huge burden that will be112
imposed upon society by the growing numbers of the aging popu-113
lation. It is likely that considerable numbers of people will become114
informal careers, although there will also be a huge expansion of115
demand for health care and residential care.116
Migration is the other aspect of demographic change that will117
become more critical. Changes in migration are the factor at the118
margin of demographic change in the UK. If birth rates remain low,119
then without migration there may be a shortage of employees,120
or at least a tightening of labour markets. The nationally impor-121
tant growth of economic wealth in the London and the South122
East has been sustained by huge migration (internal and exter-123
nal). As financial services jobs were created, and manufacturing124
jobs were lost, unemployment was a consequence, often hidden125
by aggregate growth. Moreover, the South East has had a mas-126
sive distorting effect on national labour markets as it has drawn127
in UK regional migrants, especially those with higher skills. Some128
of these migrants have returned to the regions as part of the ‘esca-129
lator’ effect2 (Fielding, 1992). However, London continues to be a130
1 Unless otherwise indicated data is sourced from Regional Trends–various dates.
2 Where people migrate to London temporarily (perhaps for a couple of years) to
achieve improvement in experience and responsibility, or simply income, which
net beneficiary of migration from the regions, and from interna- 131
tional migration. The recent rise in migrants from the EU accession 132
countries has been eroded both by the recession and by the cyclical 133
nature of this migration. These economic migrants tend to return 134
home within a short period. The first destination of migrants has 135
been overwhelmingly London. Clearly, future international migra- 136
tion patterns are impossible to predict. However, it does seem as 137
if the UK will be strategically reliant upon migration, and politi- 138
cal support is likely to be lent to it. Internal migration may be a 139
different story. 140
It is likely that these employment patterns will stabilise. Pres- 141
sures to work longer will intensify because of current and future 142
deficits in the pension system. Likewise, the housing debts incurred 143
during the 1990s andmore recentlywill remain an issue for house- 144
hold budgets. It is likely that there will be a repeat of the periodic 145
crises of negative equity, and that thesewill periodically stall hous- 146
ing markets. The adverse ratio of earnings to house prices means 147
that there will have to be an increase in the provision of social 148
rented housing if a future workforce is to be housed, especially 149
those entering the labourmarket.3 The location and funding of this 150
housing will be an issue. Those who are most vulnerable to being 151
squeezedoutofurbanhousingmarkets arekeyworkers, or lowpaid 152
public sector workers, without whom cities will cease to function. 153
Despite the economic cycles, the UK population has become 154
wealthier at an aggregate level, although the social and spatial dis- 155
tribution of wealth is little changed.4 But although the population 156
hasmoredisposable income, socialmobility has failed to keeppace. 157
Social and economic divisions,which are sharpest between London 158
and the regions, are a critical point. Increased income means more 159
leisure spending, and more consumption generally. One particu- 160
lar aspect of this has been a dramatic rise in the number of cars, 161
currently in excess of 23 million, creating pressures on transport 162
infrastructure and a massive modal split in favour of the car. The 163
time is fast approaching when the excess number of cars in rela- 164
tion to road space will increase travel times, and the convenience 165
of cars will be threatened. 166
Social changes may stimulate different demands for housing. 167
The trend has been towards single person flats and smaller house- 168
holds, despite a relatively stable population. Forecasts suggest a 169
29% rise in households by 2031. The real question concerns the 170
location of demand for new homes. The focus on economic growth 171
in the South East has both elevated house prices there, and created 172
huge pressures on land supply. This may become a limiting factor 173
for the growth of the South East. In the regions there is considerable 174
slack in supply, and over-supply inmanyplaces.5 Demand for these 175
houses will to a great extent depend on the prospects for sustained 176
economic growth in the regions outside the South East. 177
One of the clearly signalled problems concerns loan restric- 178
tions thatmay encourage familymembers to remain in households 179
longer, depressing new household formation. A similar process 180
may lock out migrants from the South East, and force youth to 181
migrate from the South East. The cost of university education may 182
they are able to ‘cash in’ on their subsequent return to the regions or other
countries.
3 In 2008 the ratio of first time buyer house prices to income in London–the least
affordable region–was 4.8. This is unsustainable ifmortgage offers cannot risemuch
above 3. Source: Nationwide Building Society.
4 See the report on social mobility (Cabinet Office, 2008, “Getting on,
getting ahead”). Elliott (2007) ‘Inequality at same level as under Thatcher’
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/may/18/politics.socialexclusion. A crit-
ical impetus to change in social mobility is widening access to and the quality of
education. Gains in socialmobilitywill be dependent on education investment, and,
as we have noted, access to Southern labour markets.
5 The North East has the slowest predicted rise in households; however, it is
predicted that there will be a 16% growth in the NE over the period 2006–2031.
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also exacerbate this shift in demand from single occupied stock183
in inner urban areas, with a possible shift towards local univer-184
sity entrance. This would have a massive impact on provincial185
university town housing markets, where much accommodation is186
currently provided for student rental.187
Another key demographic characteristic of the next 50 years188
will be the growth in the proportion of the aged population. The189
pattern of care chosenwill determine how this demand ismanifest190
in housing terms, but if current trends continue more sheltered191
accommodation will be required, and services will increasingly192
have to orientate to the aged. This may mean a reversal of the193
car-borne living that we are currently experiencing.194
Technology195
Technological change is mediated by social and institutional196
processes that may aid or hinder its rate of development, or cru-197
cially modify its eventual form. In this section we cover three198
categories of technology: Information, Energy and Health.199
There has beenmuch speculation about the impact of technolo-200
gies on work. The simplest model is that of labour substitution;201
however, the usual course is the development of new products and202
new possibilities which were not initially envisaged. The classic203
case has been the development of the computer: the initial notion204
was of an automated calculator, but the industry, and the lifestyle205
it has created, have had a farmore pervasive impact. In recent years206
there has been much commentary about the possibilities of virtu-207
ality and the reduction of the need to be physically present: this208
in turn has led to speculation about urban life and land use, best209
exemplified by the notion of the ‘death of distance’ (Cairncross,210
1998). A number of research projects have pointed out that such a211
projection is misplaced (Pratt, 2000).212
Evidence points to a future of more complex organisational213
modifications. People will work both remotely and at home. It is214
clear that the ‘hot-desking’ worker is one consequence. Research215
also indicates the emergence of nomadic workers: workers who216
have no base but who work in several locations as needed (Perry217
and Brodie, 2005). There is also the case of the home worker, who218
will commonly be based part of the time away fromhome at awork219
base and part of the time at home. All of these variants do point to220
the end of the factory, or office, as we know it: a large building221
where all workers have a desk, and which they call their place of222
work. We might describe the new built form that may emerge as223
the ‘hot office,’ a central node that workers can check in and out224
of and get the critical ‘face-time’ they need. In addition, a num-225
ber of knowledge-intensive tasks will always rely upon repeated226
face-to-face communication. Such activities will generate a need227
for clusters of workspaces, that critically may be as much about228
socialising as working. It is likely that these clusters will require229
prime inner city sites. In parallel wewould expect a similar worker230
support and socialising structure to emerge around the places of231
residence of ‘home workers’ to provide their social milieu (Pratt,232
2008). The positive element might be that some home working233
may reduce demand for transport systems.234
Other authors have explored the impact of the energy crisis on235
cities. The biggest debate is about compact cities–the notion that a236
concentration of land useswill bring about a decreased demand for237
travel and energy use (Breheny, 1992). This notion assumes simple238
radial commuting patterns and the possibility of controlling land239
uses for living andworking across several labourmarket segments,240
neither of which seem consistent with the likely outcomes. The241
outcome is just as likely to be more commuting (see Jarvis and242
Pratt, 2006). Moreover, the focus on energy usage and generation243
suggests that open rather than compact cities aremore efficient for244
energy generation. This points to the self-sustaining, or renewable245
energy generating, city being more akin to the sprawling land uses 246
that planning systems have sought to resist. 247
One potential change that might re-configure the relationship 248
of the South East to the regions is train travel. The current network 249
is congested.6 A step change such as new investment in high-speed 250
links withmajor cities in the North could have a potential regener- 251
ating effect, butmay take a long time to develop.7 Aswe know from 252
the New Towns programme, and especially Milton Keynes, there is 253
a long initial phase of commuting before people relocate. 254
We can expect to see social polarisation exacerbated by access, 255
or not, to transportation. The increasing disarticulation of home 256
and work is generating relative ‘transport poverty’ where some 257
people are less able to afford to travel to access services or jobs. 258
The fundamental challenge is one that will be felt by all of society: 259
namely the increasing disconnects, and potentially increased time 260
needed to travel, between the activities necessary for daily life. The 261
degree to which transport poverty, or environmental constraints, 262
or simply congestion, will precipitate a crisis is an issue that land 263
use planners will be presented with. 264
Finally, we can consider health technologies. These are critical 265
as they are likely to reduce death rates, and lead to people liv- 266
ing longer. This will further exacerbate the aging crisis that society 267
already has to look forward to. This may impact on land use in two 268
main ways. First, there will be increased pressure for residential 269
homes, whether new or converted from existing buildings. Second, 270
there will be demand for new and existing residential properties 271
to be adapted to cope with an increasingly immobile population. 272
Mobility for the elderly will become a key issue in terms of access 273
to local services. All of these changes could be exacerbated by the 274
failure of the pensions system to provide support for these future 275
pensioners (given that they may not have adequate pensions, and 276
no state pension), compounded by the fact that the working popu- 277
lation will be smaller in both absolute and relative terms. 278
Industry 279
The massive decline in the extractive and manufacturing activ- 280
ities and the loss of port activities has been most evident in the 281
Northern regions and the core cities. The loss of three million 282
manufacturing jobs has been more than replaced by service sec- 283
tor growth. However, the jobs have not been replaced like for like; 284
a massive restructuring has taken place. Unlike other regions, Lon- 285
don and the South East have more than compensated for their loss 286
of manufacturing by the growth of the service economy, particu- 287
larly in financial and business services. From the early 1970s to the 288
1990s, London lostmost of itsmanufacturing jobs, but over thenext 289
decade this loss was replaced by the same number of gross jobs in 290
other industries, leading to little net change. The industries that 291
gained were those that were more productive, and which would 292
continue to grow in later years. However, there was considerable 293
displacement ofworkers and landuse: the new jobswere not taken 294
by the old workers, or in the same locations. 295
The headline shift from manufacturing to services in the UK 296
regional economy has two dimensions: the relocation of produc- 297
tion to the cheapest sites in global and national peripheries, and 298
at the same time, the consolidation of control, research and devel- 299
opment, into a few key sites in the core regions. This spatiality is 300
expressed at an international scale (the outsourcing of production 301
activities to China, or of routinised customer services to India), as 302
well as the regional scale, where the Northern regions have been 303
6 Estimates point to the current rail network reaching full capacity in 2040. See
Adkins (2009).
7 New high speed rail plan. See Adkins (2009).
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the recipients, and subsequently losers to international competi-304
tors, of the back office activities of London and the South East.305
London and the South East have consistently had the smallest306
proportion of manufacturing jobs throughout the past 50 years,307
currently 5% and 9% respectively. The highest concentration of308
manufacturing jobs is in the East Midlands (15%), closely followed309
by the West Midlands and the Northern regions.8 It is likely that310
these figures will continue to fall as the economy continues to be311
dominated by service activity. Parts at least of the service sector are312
the fastest growing, and have the greatest value added. In recent313
years the creative industries have been a surprise area of growth in314
all regions, but in particular in London and the South East, and have315
joined financial services, health and education as leading areas of316
expansion. Financial services and the creative industries are partic-317
ularly dominated by the command and control, and research and318
development, located in the SouthEast,makingdevelopment in the319
regions dependent on decisions taken there. These regions did not320
fare sowell as the South East. Theirmanufacturing declinewas par-321
tially replacedbyback office activities,which themselves remained322
vulnerable to further relocation. This has led to the regions having a323
relatively weaker competitive position. Overall, this shift has hard-324
ened the ‘North–South’ economic divide that first characterised325
economic decline in the 20th century and has continued to charac-326
terise the growth of the 21st century. For example, many of the327
newer jobs were created on outer-urban industrial estates and328
science parks at motorway interchanges. The key growth of high329
technology jobswas concentrated along theM4 andM11 corridors.330
This spatial pattern seems to be entrenched. It is one that can331
only be exacerbated by the economic restructuring outlined above,332
and that characterises the industries that will deliver growth and333
income in the 21st century. The gross value added per head in Lon-334
donand theSouthEast standsat166, and106 respectively (if theUK335
is 100): the North East, NorthWest, and Yorkshire andHumberside336
languish at 79, 87, and 85 respectively. Accordingly, the vast tracts337
of industrial zoned land in the Northern regions will progressively338
be transferred to other uses, such as retail and housing.339
Interwoven in this process has been the reorganisation of340
retailing and distribution. The first supermarkets emerged in the341
UK in the 1960s, and by the 1980s the out-of-town superstore.342
Big-box retailers have been facilitated by changes in logistics343
(McKinnon, 1989) like those that have affected manufacturing,344
including the adoption of just-in time systems and regional and345
national warehouse hubs (Lowe and Wrigley, 1999; Wrigley and346
Currah, 2006). In spatial terms this has led to the progressive347
abandonment of city centre locations first for ‘big-box’ goods, and348
then for all retail. This has led to a further ‘hollowing out’ of city349
centres, and pressure on motorway intersections to take on the350
role of new employment hubs.351
A likely trend will be the consolidation of services at single352
nodes. All of this raises the prospect of what North American353
authors have referred to as ‘edge cities’ (Garreau, 1991), cities that354
are polycentric or rather are all edge and no centre. This may hap-355
pen in the Manchester-Leeds conurbation and London. It is likely356
that a versionof ‘smart growth’–aprivatelymanagedurbanismthat357
aspires to ‘non-sprawl’–may take off in such locales (Beauregard,358
2002, 2006).359
Employment360
The structural shift in employment has led to massive changes361
in labourmarkets. Themost notable is the increase in participation362
8 The UK average for manufacturing jobs is 11%, compared to 17% in 1991.
rate9; however, looked at more closely this is mainly accounted 363
for by the entry of more women into the labour market, to a 364
point where there is now something close to gender equality in 365
gross employment. But the types of jobs that women are doing are 366
more likely to be less than full time, lower paid, and impermanent. 367
Womenareover represented in thenewmanufacturing and service 368
sector growth, especially in retailing. At the same time, men who 369
lost jobs have not had such success in re-entering the labour mar- 370
ket (Young, 2002). Of course, these patterns are further amplified 371
in both a metropolitan and a north–south split. 372
The pattern of employment inevitably echoes industrial change. 373
However, the shift in employment patterns highlights a shift in the 374
nature of work, andwho does it. The industrial restructuring noted 375
above has been masked to an extent by these shifting patterns, 376
especially the growth in female workers and of part-time work, 377
and the loss of male full time work. Thus, unemployment in these 378
regions in characterised by oldermale workers who are unlikely to 379
everwork again,whilst employment is characterised bymanynew, 380
female entrants to the labour market, who are working less than 381
full time. The growth industries have been the back office activities 382
and retailing and manufacturing to a far lesser extent. Thus the 383
character of employment and unemployment is shifting. Economic 384
activity rates have grownby7% in the past 50 years andhave grown 385
especially rapidly for women and in the South. The other regions 386
will thus be more sensitive to recession. Average hours worked 387
have fallen slowly, by 3% on average (Young, 2002). 388
Another aspectof structural change inworkhasbeen thegrowth 389
of more flexible working. This should be differentiated from part- 390
time working and may involve sequential employment. However, 391
it is characterised by a less stable employment pattern. This change 392
has impacted most on high-level professions in the more innova- 393
tive and growing areas of the economy and has a disproportionate 394
impact on London and the South. It has been argued that suchwork 395
patterns require workers to be present in particular locations, per- 396
haps hot desks and work clusters that need to be in the South East. 397
This has led to the emergence of new clusters of economic activity, 398
something that governments have been keen to promote (see DTI, 399
2001). 400
It is clear from the previous section that changes in the organ- 401
isation of work in order to be more competitive and to provide 402
market leading products, have been significant. This is a trend that 403
will continue. If we examine some of the leading edges of eco- 404
nomic change, for example the knowledge economy, in particular 405
the creative industries, we can perhaps get some idea of the char- 406
acter of changes that will be found more widely in the economy 407
(see Jarvis and Pratt, 2006, on extensification: the temporal and 408
material ‘spill-over’ of work into the home). 409
Themainaimof companies is to reduce the riskofmarketfluctu- 410
ation and of being left with greater overheads (of goods in storage, 411
or people) that are not productive (Reich, 2000). The notion of ‘just 412
in time production’ is a manifestation of this. What can be noted 413
from many cultural businesses is that larger companies are seek- 414
ing to outsource almost everything, the extreme case being where 415
resources are pulled together for a single project (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 416
2009). Elsewhere, there has been much discussion of the develop- 417
ment of project based companieswhere unique talent is assembled 418
for a particular task, and disbanded directly the project is com- 419
pleted, after a few days or months (Grabher, 2002). An important 420
consequence is for workers who are denied continuity of employ- 421
ment and other benefits. Many authors have discussed how such 422
conditions lead to the development of ‘portfolio careers’ where 423
9 Currently 7% overall: 79% for men, and 70% for women.
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workers are basically self-employed or freelancers (Leadbeater and424
Oakley, 1999; Pratt et al., 2007). Such uncertainty has significant425
implications for social welfare systems and the ability to take out426
loans, people working in this way need to be mobile.427
Non-trend events428
Cutting across the normative trends mentioned above are a429
number of non-trend events that we might consider as significant430
threats that should temper our discussion.431
The first of these is a consequence of the global warming432
scenario that has already entered the land use system through433
transport andurbandesign. Thequestionof sea-level riseandflood-434
ing could have major implications.10 Even modest increases in sea435
level rise and river flooding would imperil much housing land, as436
well as industrial and business services property. This would cause437
a land shortage as well as generating civil emergencies and costs. It438
might be that a strategicmove to the hinterlands and regions could439
force a reconsideration of the relationship of London and the South440
East to the Midlands and the North.441
The second issue concerns strategy regarding the availability442
of land suitable for residential development. Even if substantial443
amounts of brownfield industrial land are recycled as residential444
sites themore extensive land use demands of the future, especially445
those causedby themultiplicationofhouseholds, could foreseeably446
present problems in particular locations where demand peaks.11447
This could put pressure on the conversion of land away from448
agriculture.12 On one hand, increased productivity in farming has449
led to more productive use of land; on the other hand, there are450
countervailing threats that could increase demand for agricultural451
land. Foremost amongst these might be a significant shift in the452
balance away from an increasing reliance on food imports towards453
self-sufficiency. Such a shift could occur in response to national454
security concerns prompted by conflict that disrupted production455
from import nations, as a result of disruptions to international456
transport due to energy costs, or as a result of social and polit-457
ical concerns about environmental impacts of international food458
sourcing. A policy of national self-sufficiency would place huge459
pressures on the land use system not only in terms of food pro-460
duction but also in relation to leisure and recreation: a purpose for461
which the countryside is being increasingly used.Whilst social and462
environmental concerns would militate against the loss of ‘trophy’463
countryside (national parks, greenbelts, AONB, etc.) thiswould cre-464
ate significant competition for land use elsewhere, notably close to465
cities.466
Energy security and energy costs are also significant. Govern-467
ment strategies point towards a substantial nuclear component to468
future base load electricity provision. However, renewables will469
play a significant role. The pressure on land for wind power will470
intensify, and the same pressure will affect the use of inshore471
waters. There will be wholesale refurbishment and rebuilding of472
the energy infrastructure. Planning and land use control are likely473
to take on a strategic role in the management of this change.474
Finally, a more overt political shift may change the balance of475
economic power and the flow of migration. There are been ongo-476
ing discussions regarding place-based, or local, taxation. A local477
10 Current estimates indicate a sea level rise of 0.6m by 2100. See Nicholls et al.
(2007).
11 Whilst there could be sufficient aggregate supply, there is the potential for local
supply-demand mismatches.
12 A trend that has been small in absolute terms (2% loss in the last 20 years).
Agriculture still accounts for 76% of UK land use. However, future pressures will
be experienced most acutely, on the edges of urbanised areas, especially around
London in the South East and the East of England.
or regional income tax might potentially reconfigure business and 478
household costs. An immediate impact would be that London and 479
the South East would become disproportionately expensive to live 480
in, as the cost of public services and infrastructure was more effec- 481
tively signalled by a tax charge. Likewise the regionswould become 482
more competitive in terms of business costs and residential costs. 483
This might have an impact on rebalancing the regional pattern of 484
development. Current discussions have viewed local income tax as 485
a small component alongside council tax; the full impact would 486
only be felt if local income tax were dominant.13 487
Conclusion: implications for land use 488
In this paper we have outlined the major drivers of future land 489
use produced by changes in employment and industry in the UK. 490
The paper has highlighted four areas of change from which signif- 491
icant pressure on land use might emanate. Our approach has been 492
for the most part a normative one, bearing in mind that infras- 493
tructure sunk investment is very long term, and cannot easily be 494
reversed. Moreover, the UK’s core population dynamics seem to be 495
stable although the aging population is likely to be an increasingly 496
important factor driving land use demands. 497
We raise a number of issues concerning international and inter- 498
regionalmigration toLondonand theSouthEast,whichwill present 499
continual pressureon landuse there.We forecast anumberofprob- 500
lems associatedwith the exacerbation of housing and housing land 501
shortage in London and the South East (and the surplus elsewhere), 502
which runs counter to migration pressures. In the South East and 503
London these pressures are likely to become critical as congestion 504
or energy costs make movement by car inefficient. Potentially this 505
could threaten growth in the South East, and by extension, the 506
growth of the UK economy, and is a serious threat. 507
We found that technology applied to the future of work might 508
generate a dual shift towards, on one hand, home working (where 509
there would be pressure on local planning rules) and, on the other 510
hand, towards new multi-functional ‘hot offices’ in city centres. 511
These buildings, or city quarters, would offer flexible space, rented 512
by the hour to a variety of companies, their contactors, or simply 513
to the growing body of freelance workers. Whilst the ubiquity of 514
computing and communications technologies will tend to loosen 515
spatial ties, a simultaneous countervailing trend will strengthen 516
locational ties; albeit in a different manner. Permanent proximity 517
to co-workers is likely to be replaced, for many, by the need to 518
network with workers who need periodic briefing, meetings and 519
face-to-face contacts.14 520
In terms of the regional distribution of industry, we felt that 521
the evidence pointed to a continuation, or even a hardening, of the 522
North–South divide into economic activity and economic opportu- 523
nity. Indeed, London and the South East seemed destined to play an 524
even stronger role in terms of the balance of growth, havingmost of 525
the higher gross value-added sectors. Industries likely to be leading 526
the economy in this period and these regions are the financial ser- 527
vices, education, health and the creative industries. Retailing will 528
continue to play a major role in the economy, as will logistics and 529
distribution, although the latter may be threatened by congestion 530
and energy concerns. Retail outlets and distribution hubs are likely 531
13 The idea has been implemented in Sweden (see Loughlin andMartin, 2004), and
has been variously considered by both the Liberal Democrats in England and the
Scottish National Party (as a replacement to the property-based Council tax). The
current Labour administration has discussed the idea as a supplement to Council
Tax, see Waugh (2004).
14 See, for example, evidence from research on the emergent new media spaces
(Pratt, 2001). Q1
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to favour extensive land uses on the edges of cities, leading to an532
extension of what US commentators term the Edge City.533
The nature of work is also changing. We see the current period534
as the high point in terms of total full time employment.We expect535
a fall in total employment, and a fall in activity rates (especially as536
the aged population increases and more care workers are needed).537
Some parts of industry are now demanding more flexible work538
practices and combinations in which fewer hours are worked. In539
other cases the serial contracting model is stronger. The notion of540
the portfolio career is likely to becomemore pronounced. This will541
have a knock on effect of creating unstable demands for land use.542
Whereas in the past, stable numbers of employees worked from a543
factory, in the future the location and numbers of employees are544
likely to bemore variable. Thiswill make demand farmore difficult545
to model.546
Of course, these normative scenarios present only the core of547
what is likely to transpire. There is likely to be a considerable range548
of responses.We tried tomodify our viewbyalso considering some,549
low probability, non-trend events. It is these that had the potential550
to disrupt the normative position of the dominance of London and551
theSouthEast and to create a landuse crisis thatwould threaten the552
position of the South East, and the emergent balance of economic553
power and resources in the UK.554
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